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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION f ,,,
DOCKET NO.CU v "

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

*
*
*
Plaintiff
*
*
V.
*
*
JOHN W B COOPER, an individual
*
residing in the State of
*
New Hampshire and d/b/a j a
*
Cooper Paving,
*
*
Defendant

,y

STATE OF MAINE,

COMPLAINT AND MOTIONS FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTIONS

The State of Maine, by and through its Attorney General,
Richard"S. Cohen, alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

The Attorney General commences this action in the

public interest pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 206 et seq«, commonly
known as the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.
2.

Defendant John Cooper is an individual residing in the

State of New Hampshire, and doing business as an asphalt paving
contractor under the name Cooper Paving.

;"'2
1

2
NATURE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE
3.

Defendant Cooper engages in the business of asphalt

or "hot top" paving, specializing in preparation, paving and
sealing of driveways, walkways, and other areas contiguous to
residential homes and garages normally subject to asphalt paving.
4.

In pursuit of asphalt paving business, Defendant Cooper

travels around the State of Maine in the warmer months of the
year, soliciting homeowners to have their driveways and walkways
paved and sealed by the Defendants.
5.

In furtherance of his asphalt paving business, the

Defendant operates certain trucks and other equipment used for
the paving and preparation of sealing of surfaces.
VIOLATIONS ALLEGED
6.

In at least four instances known to the Attorney General

the Defendant Cooper has,using unfair sales tactics, solicited
paving or sealing business in violation of the requirements of
the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4661 et. seq.) .
7.

It is an unfair trade practice and in violation of

5 M.R.S.A. § 207 to solicit paving or sealing jobs in violation
of the requirements of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
8.

In at least two instances known to the Attorney General

the Defendant Cooper contracted to perform paving or sealing work
that would be free from defective materials or workmanship and
the resulting job was of poor quality.
9.

It is an unfair trade practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A

§ 207 for the Defendant to contract that the paving and sealing
work will be of good quality and to then fail to provide a
reasonably well done job.

10.

In at least three instances known to the Attorney

General, the Defendant Cooper, in conducting his paving business
violated the requirements of the Transient Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A.
§ 4681 et seq.).
11.

It is an unfair trade practice in violation of

5 M.R.S.A. § 207 for the Defendants to conduct their paving business
in violation of the Transient Sales Act.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff State of Maine respectfully requests
\
that this Court:
1.

Decree that Defendant Cooper has engaged in unfair

or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce
in

violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
2.

Permanently enjoin Defendant Cooper from engaging in

the business of asphalt paving in the State of Maine until he has
had approved by the Department of the Attorney General, a sample
contract that satisfies the requirements of the Consumer Solicitations
Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4661 et; seq.) .
3.

Permanently enjoin the Defendant Cooper from engaging

in the business of Asphalt Paving in the State of Maine until he
has satisfied the requirements of the Transient Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A.
§ 4681} .
4.

Order the Defendant Cooper to hence forth use this

or an equivalent contract in their door-to-door solicitations for
residential paving or sealing work costing $25 or more.

5.

Order the Defendant Cooper to adhere to the Consumer

Solicitation Sales Act and not commence any residential paving
or sealing work regulated by that statute until three business
days have elapsed since the signing of the contract by the Consumer
and the Defendant Cooper.
6.

Restore to all homeowners who have lost money as a

result of Defendant Cooper's violations of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 in an
amount not to exceed the amount acquired from these homeowners by
the Defendant, as a result of these violations.
7.

Award to the Plaintiff State of Maine its costs of

suit as provided in 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
8.

Grant such further relief as the case may require and

the Court may deem just and proper.

I f/
James A. McKenna, III
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division
Department of the Attorney General
State Office Building, Room 505
Telephone 289-3716

STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO,

KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.
JOHN W. COOPER,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES A, MCKENNA, III

\
I,

James A. McKenna, III, an Assistant Attorney General, Stat

of Maine, upon information and belief, depose as follows:
1.

The Maine Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A.

§ 4661 et seq., offers consumers specific protection from
high pressure door-to-door solicitations, including a very
detailed written contract which contains a statement informing
the consumer he has three business days within which to reject
the contract,
2.

The consumer Solicitation Sales Act states that violations

of this Act are both a Class E crime and a violation of the
Maine Unfair Trade practices Act (5 M.R.S.A. § 206 et seq.).
3.

The plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Defendant

has clearly violated the consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
4.

The Plaintiff has reason to believe that the Defendant,

even though the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act was enacted

into law in .1969, does not adhere to its provisions
and that his normal course of doing business systematically
violates this law»
5»

The consumer Solicitation Sales Act finds in effect

that failure to meet its standards places, per se, a
consumer under unfair pressure from door-to-door salesmen.
6.

Upon information and belief, as an example of how door-

to-door solicitors can place unfair pressure on a timid
consumer, consider the August 23, 1980 report by State
Police Officer Sperry who summoned the Defendant for a
violation of the consumer Solicitation Sales Act:
"Mrs. Ricker stated she was very unsatisfied
with the job and was embarrassed because she
felt she was taken in. Originally she did
not want anything done because they were
going to tear up her driveway for the new
water line. Mrs. Ricker stated no contract
was ever presented to her or the verbally
or written [statement] offering her a chance
to back out.... Mrs. Ricker also was not
given any business card and did not know how
to reach Mr. Cooper".
7.

The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Defendant

in some instances takes additional advantage of his
illegal high pressure sales techniques by failing to
provide work that is of good quality and in violation of
the Maine Unfair Trade practices Act.
8.

The Defendant has further frustrated consumer rights

by conducting his paving business in violation of the

Maine Transient Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4681 et seq.
This Act seeks to provide dissatisfied consumers with a
measure of protection by requiring sellers without a Maine
permanent place of business to be licensed by the State
and bondede

violation of this Act is both a class D

crime and an unfair trade practice in violation of
5 M.R.S.A, § 207.
9.

The allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint
\

constitute immediate, irreparable injury, loss and damage
to Maine consumers and must be ordered stopped as soon as
possible because:
A.

This time of year is part of the driveway paving

"season".
B.

Illegal sales tactics must be stopped before a

seemingly binding contract is made as consumers are
afraid to later challenge a contract apparently freely
agreed to.
C.

Defective paving work is not always immediately

evident.

An apparently good paving job can shortly later

be revealed as terribly flawed.

In every allegation

in this Complaint the Defendant was not working in
the city of his residence,

if defects do not quickly

appear the Defendant can have already moved on,
leaving the consumer without effective recourse.

D.

li

Violation of the consumer Solicitation Sales Act

and the Transient Sales Act are both crimes as well
as unfair trade practices in violation of 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 207.

Thus, the seriousness of future violations also

demands the remedy of a temporary restraining order.
10.

in addition to the clear immediate and irreparable

damages this restraining order will prevent, under the Maine
Unfair Trade practices Act, an illegal trade practice is,
per se, immediate irreparable harm and therefore eligible
for a Temporary Restraining Order (5 M.R.S.A. § 209).

As

UV industries, Inc, v. Posner, 466 P. Supp. 1251, 1255 -56
(D.C. Me. 1979) states:
Where, however, a,statute provides for injunctive relief upon
shewing of a violation, the party seeking such
relief need not make a showing of irreparable
harm in the normal equity sense. See 7 Moore's
Federal practice § 65.04(1) n. 7b, and cases
there cited. The rationale for such an exception
with respect to injunction suits which are "creatures
of statute" is that the party bringing the suit is
acting to vindicate the public interest. See S.B.C.
v. Management Dynamics, 515 F. 2d 801, 808 (2d circ.
1975). As the Supreme court stated in Hecht v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 331, 64 S. Ct. 587, 592, 88 L.Ed. 754
(1944), "standards of the public interest not the
requirements of private litigation measure the
propriety and need for injunctive relief in these
cases."

JAMES A. MCKENNA III
Assistant Attorney General

personally appeared the above-named James A. McKenna, III
and made oath to the truth of the foregoing affidavit.

Dated;

September 12, 1980

STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

KENNEBEC, SS.

k

STATE OF MAINE,

k

Plaintiff

k
k

v.

*
*

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

k
k
k

JOHN W. COOPER

k

Defendant

1.

k

This matter came to be heard on the Plaintiff's Complaint

and Affidavit, seeking a Temporary Restraining Order with notice
by mail pending hearing and determination of its request for a
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, and it appearing to the Court
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage will result
to consumers in this State before a hearing on the request for a
Preliminary Injunction can be heard in that:
A.

This is the time of year that residential driveway

pavers can solicit significant amount of business.
B.

The Defendant conducts business in violation of

the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
C.

The Defendant conducts business in violation

of the Transient Sales Act.
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2.

Therefore, on the basis of the Plaintiff's Complaint

and Affidavit, it is ordered that the Defendant, their agents,
employees and all persons in active concert or participation with
them are hereby restrained until
A.

, 1980 from:

Engaging in the business of asphalt paving or

sealing in the State of Maine until he:
(1)

has had approved by the Department of the
Attorney General a sample contract that
satisfies the requirements of the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4661
et seq.); and

(2)

uses this sample contract or its reasonable
equivalent in his door-to-door solicitations
for residential paving or sealing work
costing $25 or more.

B.

Commencing any residential paving or sealing work

regulated by the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act until three
business days have elapsed since the signing of the contract
required by that statute.
C.

Engaging in the business of asphalt paving or sealing

until he has satisfied the requirements of the Transient
Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. § 4691) .
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's request for a Preliminary
Injunction be set down for hearing before this Court in the Kennebec
County Courthouse on

, 1980 at

Page three

This temporary restraint is ordered without the requirement
of security which is waived, for good cause shown, because Plaintiff
is the State of Maine, acting in its sovereign capacity for the
protection of the State and of the people of the State.
Issued at Augusta this

day of September, 1980,

at

JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT„

